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Macroeconomic 
Policy Change: Ireland in Comparative Perspective 
 
 ABSTRACT  
 
This paper sets out to develop an improved framework for examining critical junctures.  This a priori 
framework is a significant improvement over existing critical juncture frameworks that lack any 
predictive element.  It is an advance for historical institutionalism in particular, and political science in 
general.  After the new framework is set out in detail here, it is tested.  The framework is used to 
examine a number of potential critical junctures in macroeconomic policy, drawn from Ireland, 
Sweden, Britain, and America in the latter half of the twentieth century. 
 
Introduction 
Institutionalists (Christensen, 1997; Gorges, 2001; Mahoney, 2000; Pierson, 2000; 
Steinmo, 1989; Thelen and Steinmo 1992) argue that crises result in abrupt changes.  
They divided the past into normal periods, and critical junctures.  However, Pierson 
(2004: 5-6) points out that critical junctures, ‘a key concept underpinning the analyses 
of temporal processes, have received only limited discussion.’  For Thelen (1999: 
388) good tools for understanding continuity have not been matched by those for 
understanding change. 
Scholars have not developed a rigorous or predictive framework for examining 
critical junctures.  This paper will do so by hypothesising that a critical juncture in 
macroeconomic policy consists of three stages: macroeconomic crisis; ideational 
change; and radical policy change.  Based upon this, we set out a framework for 
identifying critical junctures.  As Hall (1993: 277) encourages that broad concepts be 
examined through numerous cases, we test our framework on four potential 
macroeconomic crises.  From the findings we develop a set of a priori criteria for 
examining potential critical junctures in future. 
 3
 The first section discusses the critical junctures literature, the second sets out 
the criteria for case study selection, while the third examines issues relating to 
economic policy change.  The fourth section sets out the three-stage analytical 
framework, the fifth tests the framework’s capacity to identify macroeconomic crisis, 
while the sixth tests its ability to identify ideational and policy change in the wake of 
macroeconomic crisis.  The conclusion discusses wider applications of the 
framework. 
 
Section 1: Characteristics and Uses of the Critical Junctures Approach 
The literature on critical junctures sees them as branching points, resulting in the 
adoption of one course of action from among alternatives (Mahoney, 2000: 512).  
Thereafter, developments continue along that particular path (Mahoney, 2003: 53; 
Pierson and Skocpol, 2002: 9).  Pierson (2004), however, argues that institutional 
stability can also result from non-path dependent causes, implying that the concept 
should not be defined by path dependence. 
For some, a critical juncture may be brief, while for others it can be a long 
affair (Mahoney 2001).  Collier and Collier (1991) set out a framework for identifying 
critical junctures in development in Latin America.  Their definition does not suggest 
that institutional change occurs quickly (Thelen, 2004: 215).  For Mahoney (2001), 
analysing the nineteenth century liberalisation of Central America, critical junctures 
lasted decades, while their after effects were shorter.  Hogan (2005; 2006) questioned 
if these periods were in fact incremental change; labelled conversion by Streeck and 
Thelen (2005). 
 Critical junctures have also been used in research into short-term change.  
Garrett and Lange (1995: 628) showed that electoral landslides create critical 
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junctures – mandates for policy change.  Casper and Taylor (1996) employed critical 
junctures in analysing liberalisation in authoritarian regimes.  Haggard (1988: 91) 
argued that economic depressions lead to questioning of existing institutions, and 
dramatic change.  Karl (1997) employed the concept in analysing the “petro-states” 
development paths, Gal and Bargal (2002) used it to analyse occupational welfare in 
Israeli, while Hogan (2005; 2006) revised the framework to examine change in trade 
union influence over public policy. 
Collier and Collier (1991: 35) state that the contribution of the critical 
junctures concept is its focus on historical causes.  However, if focusing on the 
formative moments of institutions is critical, only being able to do so long afterwards 
is a significant weakness. 
 
Section 2: The Countries Selected for Examination 
By studying politics comparatively we can discover trends and achieve an 
understanding of broader characteristics (Blondel, 1995: 3).  The value of 
comparison is the perspective it offers, and its goal of building a body of 
increasingly complete explanatory theory (Mayer et al., 1993; Mahler, 1995).  
But, as Lieberman (2001: 5) also recommends, in addition to cross country cases, 
comparative historical analyses covering longer time spans is also beneficial.  
Thus, in order to provide a range of different, but comparable cases, we draw 
our case selection from four countries spread across four decades.    
Ireland, Britain, America and Sweden are selected for examination based 
upon “most similar” and “most different” criteria.  The requirements for “most 
similar” were long-standing democracy, and advanced capitalist state.  The 
specific criteria were stable democracy since the first half of the twentieth 
century, and founding membership of the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD).  These conditions tied together the 
principles of representative democracy and free market economy.  We utilised 
Lijphart’s (1999) categories of majoritarian and consensual democracies as the 
“most different” basis for selection, allowing us to control for varying 
institutional arrangements. 
 All of these countries’ economies are very different, while their 
performances during the latter half of the twentieth century, along with the 
policies governing them during that time, have varied dramatically.  
Nevertheless, their similarities ensure ‘the contexts of analysis are analytically 
equivalent, to a significant degree,’ while their differences place the ‘parallel 
processes of change in sharp relief’ (Collier, 1997: 40).  In comparison to Ireland, 
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the other countries provide an array of economic experiences and political 
contexts that should help us in making sense of developments in Ireland.   
 
 
Section 3: The Issue of Change in Economic Policy 
Policy change often follows policy failure (Walsh, 2006: 490).  External shocks are 
often blamed for policy change (Greener, 2001).  There is a longstanding debate on 
the relationship between economics and policy change (Haggard and Kaufman, 1995: 
3).  However, change in economic policy is complex and must be seen in the context 
of societal and political change (Feldstein, 1994).  This means that change in 
economic policy cannot be studied in isolation (Taylor, 1995).  We will test our 
hypothesis in three discrete stages, each of which will employ observable implications 
incorporating aspects of societal and political change. 
An economic crisis can unleash powerful forces of change into an economy 
that can have a wide impact (Haggard, 2003).  Solimano (2005: 76) argues that an 
economic crisis can be identified by examining indicators of growth, inflation, 
employment creation, and poverty reduction.  
Crisis implies prevailing policy cannot be sustained without continued 
deterioration (Haggard and Kaufman, 1995: 14).  An economic crisis, therefore, 
influences policy preferences (Stevenson, 2001: 621).  New ideas can change the 
policy environment (Pemberton, 2000: 790).  But, how ideas influence policy is 
something theorists have long grappled with (Taylor, 1993).  This gives rise to 
questions such as:  Where do ideas come from?  How do they relate to failing 
policies?  And, why does the paradigm underlying a failing policy sometimes change, 
resulting in policy change, whereas at other times it remains unaltered?  To examine 
this we will look at how society, and policy actors, regard current economic policy 
and the alternatives. 
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 The impact upon society of economic policy change is dependent on the 
nature of that change.  If change in economic policy is minor, the overall impact upon 
society can be negligible.  Whereas, if change in economic policy is radical the impact 
upon society can be significant.  To examine the nature of change in economic policy 
we draw upon the work of Hall (1993), which ties together the concepts of policy 
change, societal learning, and the state.    
 
Section 4: Analytical Framework 
This is a three-stage framework, derived from our hypothesis.  Initially the framework 
concentrates on economic crisis identification.  If we can identify a crisis we have 
identified an area where existing policy will come under attack.  This leads to the 
second stage, identification of ideational change.  If new ideas, providing a viable 
alternative to the current paradigm, are adopted, ideational change is confirmed.  The 
final stage is policy change identification - the dependent variable.  The level of 
policy change depends on the preceding variables, but also determines if there is a 
critical juncture in macroeconomic policy, as radical policy change is integral to our 
hypothesis. 
 
4.1 Identification of Macro-economic Crisis 
‘The literature on critical junctures views them from the perspective of crises, placing 
a particular emphasis on the tensions leading up to the critical juncture’ (Collier and 
Collier, 1991: 32).  ‘Traditionally, students of institutional change focused on the 
importance of crisis’ (Cortell and Peterson, 1999: 184).  ‘Exogenous shock is often 
cited as an explanation for policy change’ (Golob, 2003: 373).  Here the crises tested 
for are macro-economic. 
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We develop a range of observable implications to identify a macro-economic 
crisis as a severe economic low point.  Apart from the first observable that is directly 
quantifiable, identification of empirical-theoretical fit for the remainder relies upon 
the clarity of the results provided by the independent variables utilised. 
 
O1. If the main economic indicators reached decade-long lows the economy may 
have been in crisis. 
O2.  If opinion polls find the public regarded the economic in crisis, then the 
economy may have been in crisis. 
O3.  If the national media regarded the economy in crisis, then the economy may have 
been in crisis. 
  O4.  If economic and political commentators regarded the economy in crisis, then 
the economy may have been in crisis. 
O5.  If the central bank regarded the economy in crisis, then the economy may have 
been in crisis. 
O6.  If both domestic and international organisations monitoring economic 
performance regarded the economy in crisis, then the economy may have been in 
crisis. 
O7.  If elected representatives regarded the economy in crisis, then the economy may 
have been in crisis. 
O8.  If government pronouncements on the economy were consistent with a crisis 
management approach, then the economy may have been in crisis. 
 
4.2 Identification of Ideational Change 
 8
For Greener (2001: 134) exogenous shocks result in a new policy paradigm.  
However, we hypothesise that macro-economic crisis is a necessary, but insufficient, 
condition for change in economic policy.  A macro-economic crisis may result in idea 
generation, and the consolidation of agents around a new ideational paradigm.  
Ideational change, if it has occurred, may then lead to policy change.  Therefore 
ideational change stands between a crisis and policy change, determining if a crisis 
will result in a policy change.  This corresponds to McNamara’s (1998: 4-5) argument 
that actors utilise new ideas to chart new policy strategy. 
A crisis can discredit previous policies due to their inability to right the 
situation.  Economic crises can generate a range of alternatives, but policy choice 
remains ‘centred in domestic political and ideational processes’ (Golob, 2003: 375).  
When an economic model is in difficulty windows of opportunity appear in which 
agents challenge the existing paradigm (Kingdon, 1995).  They will present a range of 
new ideas to replace the ones upon which existing policy is based.  We contend that 
significant policy change is dependent upon agents reaching consensus upon, and 
consolidating around, a particular set of ideas.  This is similar to Blyth’s ‘discursive 
phase,’ where ‘agents interested in reforming existing distributional arrangements 
contest the definition, meaning and solution to the problems identified by opposing 
economic ideologies’ (1997: 234). 
We contend that new ideas are introduced into the policy domain by three 
groups of change agents.  Combinations of these change agents constitute the policy 
networks discussed by Hall (1993).  The most important are what Dahl (1961) termed 
‘political entrepreneurs.’  Political entrepreneurs ‘exploit moments of instability’ and 
‘invest resources in the creation of a new policy, a new agency, or new forms of 
collective action’ (Sheingate, 2003: 188-190).  In a crisis, a political leader, usually an 
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opposition leader, will seek out new economic policy ideas to rectify the ills of the 
existing paradigm.  The second group are Kingdon’s (1995: 179-183) ‘policy 
entrepreneurs.’  These are agents who spread ideas to replace the current paradigm.  
They may be civil servants, technocrats, academics, economists and interest groups, 
who have access to decision makers.  The final group consists of outside influences: 
the media, the OECD, IMF and the World Bank.  They critique an existing economic 
paradigm, advocating a new one.  Both policy entrepreneurs and outside influences 
are responsible for producing ideas, but the political entrepreneur acts as a figurehead, 
introducing these ideas into the policy process.  As Thatcher quipped to Ralph Harris 
of the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), when he claimed the IEA had been 
advocating market reform for two decades prior to her time, ‘Ralph, the cock may 
crow but it’s the hen that lays the egg.’1 
These three broad groupings are similar to those identified by Pemberton in 
his schema of policy learning (2000: 777).  He notes that while minor policy changes 
emanate from administrators, significant changes are dominated by networks made up 
of academics, economists, interest groups, the media, and in particular politicians.  
The triumph of a new idea depends upon ‘a workable new idea being available’ which 
change agents are prepared to promote (Oliver and Pemberton, 2004: 419).   
The observables suggest that as agents debate the viability of the old economic 
model, they generate solutions to its ills through new ideas. 
 
O1. The media questions the efficacy of the current economic model and/or specific 
policy areas. 
                                                
1 Financial Times, 20 October, 2006, p.15. 
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O2. Opposition political parties critique the current model and propose alternative 
economic ideas – at election time their platform will be built around these alternative 
ideas. 
O3. Civil society organisations, e.g. labour unions, employer organisations, consumer 
groups etc. critique the current model, reflecting Hall’s coalition-centred approach 
(1989: 12).  
O4. Widespread public dissatisfaction with the current paradigm, observable through 
opinion polls, protests etc. 
O5. External or international organisations critique the current model and/or actively 
disseminate alternative economic ideas to replace this model. 
O6. A clear set of alternative economic ideas are evident. 
O7. A clear agent of change (political entrepreneur) to inject these new ideas into 
policy arena is evident. 
 
According to Legro’s (2000: 419) two-stage model of ideational change, if agents 
agree that the existing ideational paradigm is deficient and should be replaced, the 
first stage – ideational collapse – has occurred.  Agents will propose a range of 
solutions, with one main challenger to the dominant creed.  However, ‘even when 
ideational collapse occurs, failure to reach consensus on a replacement could still 
produce continuity, as society reflexively re-embraces the old orthodoxy’ (Legro, 
2000: 424).  The crucial issue is reaching consensus on a new set of ideas.  If 
consensus is achieved it marks the second stage of Legro’s model – consolidation – 
agents coordinating a replacement set of ideas.  This can be seen in political 
entrepreneurs consolidating innovations by combining a mixture of interests to 
produce a winning coalition (Sheingate 2003: 192-193), thus, highlighting that the 
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presence, and role, of political entrepreneurs is central to the process of ideational 
change. 
 
4.3 Identification of Policy Change  
Pemberton (2000: 790), like McNamara (1998) argues that new ideas change the 
wider policy environment.  The level of policy change is dependent upon the 
preceding variables, but is also central to determining if there has been a critical 
juncture.  We hypothesise that once there is political entrepreneur led consolidation 
around a new set of ideas, a significant policy change should follow.  We argue that 
ideational change constitutes the “differentiating factor” between crises that result in 
radical policy change, and those that do not.  Therefore, we must discover if radical 
changes in economic policy follow ideational change.  The observable implications 
used here are based upon Hall’s (1993) concepts of first, second, and third order 
policy change.  Hall (1993: 291) argued that exogenous shocks, and policy failures, 
discredit the old paradigm, leading a re-examination of the belief systems through 
which that policy was created – a paradigmatic change.  He describes rare, but radical, 
and overarching changes in policy as third order changes.  The observables set out 
below enable us identify, and differentiate, both the normal and fundamental shifts in 
macroeconomic policy.  They also incorporate the idea of swift and enduring change 
developed by Hogan (2005).  As we are dealing with the concept of a critical juncture 
(radical change) we must assume this is not a long process, otherwise it would 
constitute incremental change.  Also, if the change is to endure in an environment full 
of competing actors, policy entrepreneurs, and policies in search of a home, it should 
survive for at least one change of government.  A paradigm shift in economic policy 
must encompass each of these observables.  
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O1.  If economic policy instrument settings changed (swiftly and for longer than one 
government’s term of office) there may have been a radical change in government 
economic policy.  
O2.  If the instruments of economic policy changed (swiftly and for longer than one 
government’s term of office) there may have been a radical change in government 
economic policy.  
O3.  If the hierarchy of goals behind economic policy changed (swiftly and for longer 
than one government’s term of office) then there may have been a radical change in 
government economic policy.  
 
As space permits only a brief review of the material examined we concentrate on 
cases that will highlight the framework’s analytical flexibility.  
 
Section 5: Identification of Macroeconomic Crises 
Ireland 1957-1959 
In 1956 a stagnant and closed Irish economy was finally opened to foreign 
investment.  This was an admission of the failure of the economic philosophy 
underlying protectionism.  However, this single act did not right the economy.  By 
1959 international organisations, the media, the central bank, and national 
commentators regarded the economy as in dire crisis.  All economic indicators were at 
low ebb.  The OECD (1962: 6) stated that per capita GNP grew at 2.4 per cent per 
year throughout the 1950s only because ‘net migration averaged forty-one thousand a 
year.’  However, this growth rate was among the lowest in the OECD (OECD, 1962: 
6).  Ó’Gráda and O’Rourke (1995: 214) argue that ‘in the 1950s, Ireland’s relative 
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[economic] performance was disastrous.’  Taoiseach Lemass stated that 1959 was a 
crucial year for consolidating the economic foundations of political independence.1  
The leader of opposition remarked that the magnitude of the economic crisis could 
only be righted by a tremendous effort.2  The consensus pointed to a crisis in the 
economy. 
 
Britain 1969-1970 
During the 1960s Britain’s relative economic decline brought into question Keynesian 
policies.  National commentators, the media, the Bank of England, and domestic and 
international organisations, regarded the economy as in difficulty by 1970.  
Hodgkinson (1971: 1) observed that the five problems with the economy were 
inflation, unemployment, industrial relations, low growth of production, and 
uncertainty over Europe.  The Economist pointed out that unemployment2 was at its 
highest level since May 19403, while the OECD (1970: 5) found inflation at its 
highest level in 18 years.  The Guardian argued that inflation was the most serious 
problem confronting the government.4  The Bank of England (1971: 3) observed that 
between March and June 1970 economic grow was lethargic, while industrial costs 
rose rapidly.  Days lost to industrial disputes stood at a post-war high of 11 million 
(OECD, 1970: 12).  The National Institute of Economic and Social Research’s 
(NIESR) (1970) predicted little economic growth.  Although there were problems 
with inflation and growth, overall the economy was not regarded as in crisis. 
 
 
America 1979-1981 
                                                
2 The Economist, 20-26 June, 1970, p. 73. 
3 Time International, 1 June, 1970.  Vol. 95, No. 22, p. 27. 
4 The Guardian, 8 June, 1970, p. 10.  
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The Carter administration’s final year was characterized by high interest rates, and 
rising unemployment (OECD, 1982: 9).  Compounding matters, the National Bureau 
of Economic Research declared the economy in recession.3  When the President 
invoked the Credit Control Act it resulted in reduced borrowing, and a steep decline 
in growth.4  By 1979, inflation stood at 11.3 per cent, rising to 13.5 per cent in 1980, 
while GDP growth struggled at 2.4 per cent in 1979, before slumping to -0.3 per cent 
by 1980 (Mitchell, 1998).  By the second half of 1980 the administration’s response to 
the recession smacked of crisis-management.  Carter’s Economic Renewal 
Programme to stimulate the economy was heavily criticized.5  By November Fed 
Chairman Volcker admitted there was a recession.6  In restraining the growth of the 
money supply the Fed pushed interest rates to their highest levels in a century, 
reducing consumer borrowing, and sending spending into decline.7  ‘Through the 
actions of the Reserve Board and the administration, the economy was inadvertently 
plunged into the kind of recession the White House had been trying to avoid’ (Dark, 
1999: 120).  
 
Sweden 1980-1982 
The recession that began in the mid 1970s proved persistent.  The OECD (1982: 49) 
described the economy in 1982 as in difficulty.  Government’s expenditures had 
grown, while revenues stagnated.  The budget deficits were financed by international 
borrowing (Siven, 1984: 17), and as a consequence the debt to GNP ratio increased by 
over 250 per cent in six years.  In 1981 inflation reached 12.1 per cent, while GDP 
growth fell to -0.6 per cent.8  Unemployment reached 3.1 per cent in 1982, its highest 
level since 1945, a political scandal in a country accustomed to full employment.9  
However, economists believed unemployment would have been closer to 16 per cent 
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if it included the jobless in training programmes, workers forced into early retirement, 
and those who had given up looking for work.10  The New York Times argued that the 
Swedish economy had been hobbled by foreign debt, low investment, and an adverse 
balance of payments.11  The economy was in crisis.   
 
Table 1.1 – The Identification of Macroeconomic Crisis 
The Observable Implications  Ireland 
1959 
Britain 
1970 
America 
1981 
Sweden 
1981 
     
O1. Were the main economic indicators at 
decade-long lows? 
X  X X 
O2. Did opinion polls find the public regarded 
the economic in crisis. 
    
O3. Did the media regard the economy in 
crisis? 
X X X X 
O4. Did economic and political commentators 
regard the economy in crisis? 
X X X X 
O5. Did the central bank regard the economy as 
in crisis? 
X  X X 
O6. Did domestic/international organisations 
regard the economy in crisis? 
X  X X 
O7. Did elected representatives regard the 
economy in crisis? 
X  X X 
O8. Were gov pronouncements on the economy 
were consistent with a crisis management 
approach? 
X  X X 
Economic Crisis  Y N Y Y 
 
Of the four potential crises, Britain 1970, satisfying only two observables, was not a 
macroeconomic crisis.  As a result the British case is dropped here.  The next section 
examines if ideational change occurred following the confirmed macroeconomic 
crises, and, central to our hypothesis, if radical policy change followed in the wake of 
ideational change. 
 
Section 6: Identification of Ideational and Policy Change 
 
Ireland 1959 
Irish economic stagnation during the 1950s led to ‘vigorous debate on the economy’ 
(O’Day, 2000: 27).  This debate, conducted at national levels, among civil society 
groups, and within the media, aggressively questioned the efficacy of protectionism.  
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In turn, it was heavily influenced by the propagation of Keynesian ideas, or planned 
capitalism that was gaining salience in the US, and in much of Europe.  The ideas 
associated with the outward looking strategy that Ireland eventually adopted were first 
utilised by the coalition government of 1954-57.  They were tentatively employed in 
the 1956 decision to allow the IDA distribute grants to export-orientated industries, 
and the creation of the Export Profits Relief Tax (Suarez, 2001).  The Irish economy 
abandoned its traditional policy of protectionism and opened up to foreign investment 
for the first time (Tansey, 1998: 12). 
These innovations, although doing little to alleviate the economic woes, were 
supported by employer groups and the trade unions (Suarez, 2001).  As such, these 
moves, though only tentative, and the resultant media debate critiquing the old model 
of protectionism, ensured that the year ‘1957 is conventionally thought of as the end 
of an era, as making the final exhaustion of the ideas of the first generation of political 
leaders’ (Garvin, 1982: 37).  In an environment of disappointing economic 
performance, contestation of the existing economic orthodoxy by agents agreed on 
both its inadequacy, and need for replacement, resulted in its collapse.  
The 1957 election was fought by Fianna Fail on a platform attacking the old 
economic model, and the economic stagnation that had prevailed.  As Hall argues 
‘politicians compete for office precisely by propounding new solutions to collective 
problems which appeal to the electorate’ (Hall, 1993: 289).  Fianna Fail won the 
election, and Sean Lemass became Minister for Industry and Commerce. 
‘On his return to office in 1957 [Lemass] began the gradual process of 
opening the state to foreign investment’ (Girvin, 1994: 125).  This was despite fears 
over protected Irish industry.12  Poor economic performance prompted this 
fundamental reappraisal of the policies pursued since the 1930s.  This reappraisal was 
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embodied in the White Paper First Programme for Economic Expansion drawn up by 
the Department of Finance. 
In this regard Lemass was heavily influenced by the ideas of T.K. Whitaker, as 
set out in Economic Development.  Whitaker is a policy entrepreneur in this instance, 
as his ideas formed the backbone of the 1958 White Paper First Programme for 
Economic Expansion (Horgan, 1997).  This document laid out a coherent set of new 
economic ideas, based on an outward looking strategy and/or planned capitalism.   
With the retirement of DeValera in 1959, Lemass became Taoiseach.  The 
state of the economy, and the new ideas propagated by Lemass and Whitaker, caused 
opposition parties to coalesce around these ideas such that, during the Dail debate on 
Lemass’ election as Taoiseach, Daniel Desmond of the Labour Party argued it was 
time for the political establishment to realise that solving the problems with the 
economy superseded their own struggles for power.13  A broad range of agents had 
reached consensus on a replacement set of economic ideas, consolidating a new 
dominant ideational orthodoxy.  Lemass now had the mandate and opportunity to 
inject these new ideas into the policy arena. 
Lemass, as Taoiseach, displayed a vigorous entrepreneurial leadership 
(McCarthy, 1973: 22).  He identified the need for change in industrial development 
policy.14  Tax breaks and grants were provided to foreign firms wishing to set up in 
Ireland.  Under Lemass, an outward-orientated economic strategy became the bedrock 
of Irish economy policy (O’Donnell, 1998: 4).  Adjusting industries to competition 
led public policy into the realms of industrial relations, and pay bargaining.  Lemass 
understood that government had to play a more active role in the Irish economy, but 
realised that the success of this strategy assumed a new partnership with different 
interest groups, which would become players in the policy game (Murphy, 1997: 58).  
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The trade unions and employer organisations were brought into the policy-making 
environment, through Employer-Labour Conference.  ‘The dialogue between state 
and major socio-economic groups quickly acquired a regular and institutional 
character’ (Peillon, 1995: 370).  For the OECD (1961: 12) the Fianna Fail 
government’s 1958 and 1959 budgets marked a clear change in fiscal policy.  By 
1961, the reshaping of public capital expenditure to emphasize directly productive 
investment had stimulated economic growth.  The OECD (1961: 10) found that the 
policy of grants and tax exemptions attracted a substantial amount of foreign capital 
to Ireland.   
The late 1950s, a time of economic crisis, witnessed a dramatic shift in Irish 
economic policy.  Lemass, acting as a political entrepreneur, fostered alternative ideas 
on how the economy should be run.  Around these ideas consensus developed, leading 
to their consolidation.  Thereafter, the setting, instruments, and hierarchy of goals 
behind Irish economic policy changed.  The decision to open the economy to foreign 
investment was an admission of the failure of protectionist policy.  An economic 
crisis led to the collapse of the old economic orthodoxy, the consolidation of a new 
economic ideational structure, and a third order change in economic policy – a critical 
juncture according to our hypothesis 
 
America 1979-1981  
By the end of Carter’s administration the US economy was in trouble.  Paul Volcker, 
Federal Reserve Chairman, believed the remedy for spiralling inflation was a 
tightened money supply (Krugman, 1990), the first move towards monetarist policy.  
However, the results were limited.  The president’s imposition of new controls on 
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consumer credit contributed to the economy’s slide.  There was widespread 
dissatisfaction with, and critiques of, government policy. 
Time argued that Carter’s decisions resulted in reductions in consumer 
borrowing, and a steep decline in growth.15  ‘Recession Hits Hard’ headlined The 
Washington Post.16  Economic commentators were pessimistic about the prospects for 
recovery.  The economy was in what Walter Okun called ‘the great stagflation 
swamp.’17  The President’s inflation record is not good admitted Walter Heller.  In 
allowing the economy to deteriorate, noted Alan Greenspan, Carter was forced into a 
crash programme of restraint leading to a huge rise in unemployment.18  The critiques 
began to coalesce around a set of alternative economic ideas purporting to tackle 
current economic ills: monetarism.  With change agents in agreement on the 
inadequacy of the existing paradigm, ideational collapse had occurred. 
 Monetarist concepts had been present in American political circles since the 
early 1970s, with Milton Friedman, Robert Lucas, and Arthur Laffer, founding 
organizations such as the American Enterprise Institute (Blyth, 1997: 236-237).  
These groups ensured that by the late 1970s American economic journalism spread 
their ideas (Blyth, 1997: 237), with the Wall Street Journal acting as both ‘effective 
synthesizer and chief proselytizer for these…ideas’ (Blyth, 2002: 164).  In this respect 
both a clear set of alternative ideas, and policy entrepreneurs, were present. 
However, it was Ronald Regan, the Republican candidate for President, who 
embraced this new ideology, and adopted the role of political entrepreneur.  His 
message was lower taxes, reduced spending on social services, balanced budgets, and 
fewer governmental regulations.  He blamed the Democrats’ inflationary policies for 
stifling productivity, and bringing recession.  In late August, Reagan stated that 
President Carter had ‘created a severe depression.’19  He promised new policies and 
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leadership (Wayne, 1992: 182).  During the final stages of the election Reagan 
declared Carter’s record on inflation and unemployment ‘a failure on a scale so vast, 
in dimensions so broad, with effects so devastating, that it is virtually without 
parallel.’20  Regan forged an electoral coalition around the notion of monetarism 
(Blyth, 1997), and won the election on the back of having a discernable set of 
alternative economic ideas which could replace existing arrangements.  President 
Reagan’s election, and the accompanying Congressional election, was a clear mandate 
for conservative policies (OECD, 1982: 10).  In the wake of an economic crisis, and 
with the paradigm underlying existing economic policy collapsed, change agents 
reached consensus, and consolidated around, a new economic orthodoxy.  
Monetarism’s wide acceptance as a viable alternative idea marked an ideational 
change.  With the ideas fundamental to existing policy replaced, those policies were 
no longer armoured, and were easily changed. 
The new administration’s economic policies were very different from those of 
its predecessors in their political roots, and theoretical foundations (OECD, 1982: 9).  
Reagan fashioned his economic strategy around the monetarist proposals of Arthur 
Laffer.  To combat stagflation he promoted a painless panacea: tax cuts, and 
deregulation, wherein the resulting stimulus would boost federal revenues to balance 
the budget, reducing inflationary pressure.  The new President’s programme, dubbed 
Reaganomics, was the belief that American capitalism, freed from the burden of taxes 
and regulation, would surge ahead.  Reagan’s first budget proposed a $750 billion tax 
cut over three years (Jones, 1995: 597).  The administration also cut $11 billion from 
public works and job training programmes, unemployment benefits programmes, and 
trade adjustment assistance-benefits.21  ‘A trend towards reduced economic regulation 
was carried further by the immediate application of the remaining stages of crude oil 
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price decontrol, and the abolition of the Council on Wage and Price Stability’ (OECD, 
1982: 24). 
 In political terms Reagan capitalised on anti-government sentiment, 
emphasising individualism, and a smaller Federal role.  Tax relief was allied to a 
restructuring of federal expenditure, bringing sharp changes in the economy.  
Economic policy instrument settings, the instruments themselves, and the goals 
behind economic policy, all changed.  This third order change (paradigm shift) in 
macro-economic policy endured into the administration of Reagan’s successor.  
D’Souza (1997: 85) argues that Reagan’s programme for America was the most 
ambitious since the New Deal.  
An economic crisis led to the collapse of the ideas underlying existing macro-
economic policy.  Policy entrepreneurs advocated a replacement set of ideas, namely 
monetarism.  Consolidation around this new economic orthodoxy was achieved with 
the emergence of Ronald Reagan, the political entrepreneur.  Following his election 
there was a third order change (paradigm shift) in macro-economic policy.  Here we 
have a macro-economic crisis, ideational change, and a radical change in macro-
economic policy, which according to our hypothesis is critical juncture in macro-
economic policy.  
 
Sweden 1980-1982 
The recession of the 1970s saw the budget deficits supporting the social welfare 
system deepen.  By 1981 the non-socialist coalition government held only 102 of the 
350 seats in the Riksdag.22  In autumn 1981 the krona was devalued by 10 per cent, 
and the following spring the government introduced far-reaching austerity measures.  
However, the opposition parties gained ground (Hadenius, 1997: 129-130).  The 
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government hoped its attempts to combat the economy’s problems would generate 
respect for non-socialist policies, instead they generated widespread critiques, and 
initiated a debate on the economy.  The Financial Times pointed out that the Swedes 
were nervous about the future, but reluctant to see the welfare state’s benefits 
reduced.23  “The welfare state is in a crisis of legitimacy,’ observed Hans Vetterberg, 
Sweden’s leading public opinion analyst.  ‘We can no longer afford to keep 
expanding it.”24  Not surprisingly, the Swedish Employers’ Federation (SAF) was 
unhappy with the government.  However, the non-socialist government wanted 
neither to raise taxes, nor dismantle the welfare state.25  This situation, rife with 
unfulfilled economic expectations, and agents dissatisfied with the prevailing 
paradigm, constituted ideational collapse. 
 The 1982 election was deemed crucial as it would determine whether public 
support had shifted, as in Norway and Denmark, away from the Social Democrats.  
The election campaign was dominated by talk of economic crisis – a $10 billion debt 
to foreign banks, inflation, declining exports, and increasing unemployment.26  During 
the campaign the Social Democrats attacked the viability of another non-socialist 
government, and their economic policies.  The party presented a program on how 
Sweden could save and work its way out of crisis.  Ultimately, the election, and the 
debates surrounding it, failed to generate either a coherent set of alternative economic 
ideas to replace the existing ones, or a significant agent of change.  The non-socialist 
parties failed to create a coalition around ideas alternative to the welfare state.  Nearly 
all economic ideas presented were variations on existing themes.  Despite the 
dominant orthodoxy’s failure agents re-embraced it.  The ideas underpinning the 
policies of the welfare state endured.  The SAP won the election, not on the back of a 
 23 
new economic paradigm that could cure the country’s woes, but on a series of 
proposals to correct existing economic arrangements. 
The result was an altered approach to economic management, with minor 
changes in economic policies.  The SAP, admitting there were no ready solutions to 
the economy’s problems,27 implemented a recovery programme – The Third Road.  
This approach argued that renewed growth required redistribution of income from 
labour to capital.  It constituted a shift in SAP economic planning, behind which 
course lay the influence of its research unit, as opposed to those of the unions.  This 
marked an attempt to maintain a level of social democracy, which other countries 
were rolling back (Martin, 2000: 234).  The Third Road sought to devise a wide-
ranging stabilisation programme that included demand management measures, as well 
as initiatives to promote structural change and ensure the fair distribution of the 
burden of adjustment (OECD, 1984: 21).  The SAP was also determined to pour funds 
into job creating industries.28 
 The centrepiece of finance minister Feldt’s strategy to boost corporate profits 
was devaluation of the krona.  This measure was implemented in combination with a 
price freeze, and increases in sales and corporate taxes, in a sweeping “crisis plan”29 
aimed at reviving the economy.30  The main objective was to achieve export-led, and 
investment-fed, recovery (OECD, 1984: 21).  The LO (Landsorganisationen i 
Sverige) accommodated devaluation by demanding average wage increases of 2.5 per 
cent in the ensuing wage-bargaining round.  The devaluation and international 
economic recovery resulted in high earnings and excellent scope for export expansion 
(Ahlén, 1989: 333).  The government also restored welfare entitlements cut by the 
non-socialists (OECD, 1984: 23). 
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 To maintain the welfare state, by whatever means necessary, the government 
prioritized private sector growth, profits, and market forces.  In this case, the 
economic policy instrument settings changed, but the instruments of economic policy, 
and the goals behind economic policy, remained much the same – the maintenance of 
the welfare state.  This was a first order policy change. 
The economic crisis in Sweden generated significant debate, and ideational 
collapse occurred.  However, change agents did not consolidate around a replacement 
economic orthodoxy.  As a result, the existing economic paradigm endured, providing 
the existing economic policies with sufficient armoured protection to remain largely 
intact.  There was no critical juncture in economic policy. 
 
Table 1.2 – The Identification of Ideational Change   
The Observable Implications  Ireland 
1959 
America 
1981 
Sweden  
1982 
    
O1. Media questions efficacy of current economic model 
and/or specific policy areas 
X X X 
O2. Opposition parties critique current model and propose 
alternative economic ideas – at elections their platform are 
built around these alternative ideas 
X X  
O3. Civil society organisations critique current model, 
reflecting Hall’s coalition-centred approach 
X X  
O4. Widespread public dissatisfaction with current paradigm, 
observable through opinion polls, protests etc. 
 X X 
O5. External/international organisations critique current 
model and/or actively disseminate alternative economic ideas 
to replace model 
X X X 
O6.  A clear set of alternative economic ideas are evident X X  
O7.  A clear agent of change to inject these new ideas into 
policy arena is evident 
X X  
Adoption of New Economic Idea Y Y N 
 
 
Table 1.3 – The Identification of Change in Government Economic Policy 
The Observable Implications  Ireland 
1959 
America 
1981 
Sweden  
1982 
    
O1.  If economic policy instrument settings changed there 
may have been a radical change in economic policy  
X X X 
O2.  If the instruments of economic policy changed there 
may have been radical change in economic policy  
X X  
O3.  If the hierarchy of goals behind economic policy 
changed there may have been a radical change in economic 
policy 
X X  
Critical Juncture in Macroeconomic Policy Y Y N 
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Two of the cases examined (Ireland 1957-1959; America 1979-1981) witnessed third 
order changes (paradigm shifts) in macro-economic policy.  These third order policy 
shifts occurred following macro-economic crises, collapse of the dominant economic 
orthodoxies, the introduction of new ideas into the policy arenas, and the 
consolidation of change agents around these ideas.  They constituted critical junctures 
in macro-economic policy.  However, neither of the other two cases witnessed critical 
junctures.  In Britain 1969-1970 there was no macro-economic crisis, while in 
Sweden 1980-1982, although there was a macro-economic crisis, there was no 
ideational change.  In Sweden ideational collapse followed an economic crisis, but 
change agents failed to consolidate around a replacement orthodoxy.  The old 
orthodoxy endured, and the hierarchy of goals behind Swedish macro-economic 
policy did not change. 
These findings validate our hypothesis.  A critical juncture in macro-economic 
policy consists of three stages: macro-economic crisis, ideational change, and radical 
policy change.  A macro-economic crisis in itself is a necessary, but insufficient, 
condition for a paradigm shift in macro-economic policy.  A macro-economic crisis 
not followed by ideational change, will lead to a first (Sweden 1980-1982), or second 
order macro-economic policy change.  Whereas, a macro-economic crisis followed by 
ideational change (collapse and consolidation) will lead to a third order change in the 
dependent variable – macro-economic policy (Ireland 1957-1959; America 1979-
1981) – which combined equals a critical juncture. 
Ideational change is crucial in determining if third order macro-economic 
policy change will occur after a macro-economic crisis.  Existing ideational orthodoxy 
provides armour protection for existing policy, ensuring its continuity.  However, in 
the wake of an economic crisis, if ideational collapse should occur, existing macro-
economic policy is no longer armoured.  If change agents, led by a political 
entrepreneur, consolidate around a new set of economic ideas they will attempt to 
inject these into the policy domain.  The result of this ideational change will be a third 
order change in macro-economic policy.  However, if change agents fail to 
consolidate around a new economic orthodoxy, existing ideas will endure, and there 
will only be a first, or second, order policy change.  Therefore, political entrepreneur 
led consolidation around a new set of economic ideas is the “differentiating factor" 
between an economic crisis that leads to a critical juncture in macroeconomic policy, 
and one that does not.  This links with Pemberton’s (2000: 771) argument that 
different network configurations are associated with different orders of policy change. 
 
Discussion: Ireland in a Comparative Perspective 
The paper sought to test a framework for examining critical junctures that 
incorporated an a priori element.  This framework is based upon the hypothesis that a 
critical juncture in macroeconomic policy consists of three stages: macroeconomic 
crisis, ideational change, and radical policy change.   
Of the cases examined, Ireland 1957-1959 and America 1979-1981 constituted 
critical junctures.  The ideational foundations of existing macro-economic policy 
collapsed after economic crises.  These were replaced as change agents, led by 
political entrepreneurs, consolidated around new economic orthodoxies.  Third order 
macro-economic policy change followed ideational change.  Britain 1969-1970 was 
merely an economic downturn, whereas Sweden 1980-1982 was an economic crisis.  
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While ideational collapse occurred in Sweden, change agents, lacking the influence of 
a political entrepreneur, failed to consolidate around viable alternative ideas.  Without 
ideational change, there was only minor policy change. 
After a macro-economic crisis, established policies, having been undermined 
by previous failures, are liable to be overcome as change agents, led by a political 
entrepreneur, consolidate around new ideas.  Without a political entrepreneur to focus 
the various change agents’ interests there will be no consolidation around an 
alternative idea, i.e. no ideational change.  In the absence of ideational change the 
level of policy change will be of the first (Sweden 1980-1982) or second order. 
Political entrepreneurs are crucial to ideational change.  While policy entrepreneurs 
and outside influences generate ideas, political entrepreneurs consolidate these 
interests, and their ideas.  The political entrepreneur is the bridge between old 
ideational collapse and new ideational consolidation.  Following a macro-economic 
crisis, identification of ideational collapse, and subsequent political entrepreneur led 
consolidation around a new economic orthodoxy, should enable us predict that a third 
order change in economic policy is coming – that a critical juncture is coming.  
Ideational change is itself the bridge between economic crisis and subsequent 
economic policy change. 
By situating Ireland in a comparative context we see how radical changes 
in economic policy can have certain commonalities, irrespective of country size, 
or political structure.  The late 1950s in Ireland witnessed a dramatic shift in 
economic policy, a change in some respects more radical than that in America 
under Reagan.  Economic crisis led to the collapse of the ideas underlying 
protectionism.  Lemass, influenced by Whitaker, outside influences, and failed 
protectionism, assumed the role of political entrepreneur, fostering an 
alternative set of ideas.  Around these ideas change agent consensus developed, 
leading to their consolidation.  As in America more than 20 years later, a 
political entrepreneur’s championing of new ideas in the political arena led to a 
critical juncture in economic policy.  Leamss altered the setting, instruments, 
and hierarchy of goals behind Irish economic policy.  The absence of a political 
entrepreneur in Sweden in 1982, despite economic crisis, left the ideational 
foundations of existing policy intact, and resulted in only a first order change in 
economic policy there.   
The economic policy changes instituted by Lemass served as a 
cornerstone for Irish economic policy going forward.  Even the economic policies 
introduced in Ireland during the crisis years of the mid-1980s were framed with 
the context established by Lemass.  The idea of Ireland as a small, open, and 
outward looking economy has formed the ideational foundations of all our 
economic policies since the late 1950s.  The country’s status as the world’s most 
open economy is elegant confirmation of this, and a glowing tribute to the vision 
of Lemass half a century after he first articulated it.       
This paper draws upon crisis, ideational, and institutional literature, to create a 
framework capable not only of analysing macro-economic policy change, but other 
policy change also.  The framework could be used to predict policy outcomes in fields 
as diverse as foreign policy, democratisation, gender mainstreaming, and social and/or 
environmental policy.  Researchers will no longer have to wait decades to declare an 
event a critical juncture.  This framework broadens the applicability of the critical 
juncture concept, deepens its incisiveness, and contributes to a better understanding of 
policy change. 
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